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Reverse engineering the Intel FSP… a primer guide!

Recently, I’ve finished reverse engineering the Intel FSP-S “entry” code, that is from the entry point (FspSiliconInit) all the way to the end of the function and all the subfunctions that it calls. This is only some initial foray into reverse engineering the FSP as a whole, but reverse engineering is something that takes a lot of time and effort. Today’s blog post is here to illustrate that, and to lay the foundations for understanding what I’ve done with the FSP code (in a future blog post).

Over the years, many people asked me to teach them what I do, or to explain to them how to reverse engineer assembly code in general. Sometimes I hear the infamous “How hard can it be?” catchphrase. Last week someone I was discussing with thought that the assembly language is just like a regular programming language, but in binary form—it’s easy to make that mistake if you’ve never seen what assembly is or looks like. Historically, I’ve always said that reverse engineering and ASM is “too complicated to explain” or that “If you need help to get started, then you won’t be able to finish it on your own” and various other vague responses—I often wanted to explain to others why I said things like that but I never found a way to do it. You see, when something is complex, it’s easy to say that it’s complex, but it’s much harder to explain to people why it’s complex.

I was lucky to recently stumble onto a little function while reverse engineering the Intel FSP, a function that was both simple and complex, where figuring out what it does was an interesting challenge that I can easily walk you through. This function wasn’t a difficult thing to understand, and by far, it’s not one of the hard or complex things to reverse engineer, but this one is “small and complex enough” that it’s a perfect example to explain, without writing an entire book or getting into the more complex aspects of reverse engineering. So today’s post serves as a “primer” guide to reverse engineering for all of those interested in the subject. It is a required read in order to understand the next blog posts I would be writing about the Intel FSP. Ready? Strap on your geek helmet and let’s get started!

DISCLAIMER: I might make false statements in the blog post below, some by mistake, some intentionally for the purpose of vulgarizing the explanations. For example, when I say below that there are 9 registers in X86, I know there are more (SSE, FPU, or even just the DS or EFLAGS registers, or purposefully not mentioning EAX instead of RAX, etc.), but I just don’t want to complicate matters by going too wide in my explanations.

A prelude

First things first, you need to understand some basic concepts, such as “what is ASM exactly”. I will explain some basic concepts but not all the basic concepts you might need. I will assume that you know at least what a programming language is and know how to write a simple “hello world” in at least one language, otherwise you’ll be completely lost.

So, ASM is the Assembly language, but it’s not the actual binary code that executes on the machine. It is however, very similar to it. To be more exact, the assembly language is a textual representation of the binary instructions given to the microprocessor. You see, when you compile your regular C program into an executable, the compiler will transform all your code into some very, very, very basic instructions. Those instructions are what the CPU will understand and execute. By combining a lot of small, simple and specific instructions, you can do more complex things. That’s the basis of any programming language, of course, but with assembly, the building blocks that you get are very limited. Before I’ll talk about instructions, I want to explain two concepts first which you’ll need to follow the rest of the story.

The stack

First I’ll explain what “the stack” is.  You may have heard of it before, or maybe you didn’t, but the important thing to know is that when you write code, you have two types of memory:

  • The first one is your “dynamic memory”, that’s when you call ‘malloc’ or ‘new’ to allocate new memory, this goes from your RAM upward (or left-to-right), in the sense that if you allocate 10 bytes, you’ll first get address 0x1000 for example, then when you allocate another 30 bytes, you’ll get address 0x100A, then if you allocate another 16 bytes, you’ll get 0x1028, etc.
  • The second type of memory that you have access to is the stack, which is different, instead it grows downward (or right-to-left), and it’s used to store local variables in a function. So if you start with the stack at address 0x8000, then when you enter a function with 16 bytes worth of local variables, your stack now points to address 0x7FF0, then you enter another function with 64 bytes worth of local variables, and your stack now points to address 0x7FB0, etc. The way the stack works is by “stacking” data into it, you “push” data in the stack, which puts the variable/data into the stack and moves the stack pointer down, you can’t remove an item from anywhere in the stack, you can always only remove (pop) the last item you added (pushed). A stack is actually an abstract type of data, like a list, an array, a dictionary, etc. You can read more about what a stack is on wikipedia and it shows you how you can add and remove items on a stack with this image:

The image shows you what we call a LIFO (Last-In-First-Out) and that’s what a stack is. In the case of the computer’s stack, it grows downward in the RAM (as opposed to upward in the above image) and is used to store local variables as well as the return address for your function (the instruction that comes after the call to your function in the parent function). So when you look at a stack, you will see multiple “frames”, you’ll see your current function’s stack with all its variables, then the return address of the function that called it, and above it, you’ll see the previous function’s frame with its own variables and the address of the function that called it, and above, etc. all the way to the main function which resides at the top of the stack.

Here is another image that exemplifies this:

The registers

The second thing I want you to understand is that the processor has multiple “registers”. You can think of a register as a variable, but there are only 9 total registers on x86, with only 7 of them usable. So, on the x86 processor, the various registers are: EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX, EDI, ESI, EBP, ESP, EIP.

There are two registers in there that are special:

  • The EIP (Instruction Pointer) contains the address of the current instruction being executed.
  • The ESP (Stack Pointer) contains the address of the stack.

Access to the registers is extremely fast when compared to accessing the data in the RAM (the stack also resides on the RAM, but towards the end of it) and most operations (instructions) have to happen on registers. You’ll understand more when you read below about instructions, but basically, you can’t use an instruction to say “add value A to value B and store it into address C”, you’d need to say “move value A into register EAX, then move value B into register EBX, then add register EAX to register EBX and store the result in register ECX, then store the value of register ECX into the address C”.

The instructions

Let’s go back to explaining instructions now. As I explained before, the instructions are the basic building blocks of the programs, and they are very simple, they take the form of:


Where “INS” is the instruction”, and OP1, OP2, OP3 is what we call the “operand”, most instructions will only take 2 operands, some will take no operands, some will take one operand and others will take 3 operands. The operands are usually registers. Sometimes, the operand can be an actual value (what we call an “immediate value”) like “1”, “2” or “3”, etc. and sometimes, the operand is a relative position from a register, like for example “[%eax + 4]” meaning the address pointed to by the %eax register + 4 bytes. We’ll see more of that shortly. For now, let’s give you the list of the most common and used instructions:

  • MOV“: move data from one operand into another
  • ADD/SUB/MUL/DIV“: Add, Substract, Multiply, Divide one operand with another and store the result in a register
  • AND/OR/XOR/NOT/NEG“: Perform logical and/or/xor/not/negate operations on the operand
  • SHL/SHR“: Shift Left/Shift Right the bits in the operand
  • CMP/TEST“: Compare one register with an operand
  • JMP/JZ/JNZ/JB/JS/etc.”: Jump to another instruction (Jump unconditionally, Jump if Zero, Jump if Not Zero, Jump if Below, Jump if Sign, etc.)
  • PUSH/POP“: Push an operand into the stack, or pop a value from the stack into a register
  • CALL“: Call a function. This is the equivalent of doing a “PUSH %EIP+4” + “JMP”. I’ll get into calling conventions later..
  • RET“: Return from a function. This is the equivalent of doing a “POP %EIP”

That’s about it, that’s what most programs are doing. Of course, there’s a lot more instructions, you can see a full list here, but you’ll see that most of the other instructions are very obscure or very specific or variations on the above instructions, so really, this represents most of the instructions you’ll ever encounter.

I want to explain one thing before we go further down: there is an additional register I didn’t mention before called the FLAGS register, which is basically just a status register that contains “flags” that indicate when some arithmetic condition happened on the last arithmetic operation. For example, if you add 1 to 0xFFFFFFFF, it will give you ‘0’ but the “Overflow flag” will be set in the FLAGS register. If you substract 5 from 0, it will give you 0xFFFFFFFB and the “Sign flag” will be set because the result is negative, and if you substract 3 from 3, the result will be zero and the “Zero flag” will be set.

I’ve shown you the “CMP” instruction which is used to compare a register with an operand, but you might be wondering, “What does it mean exactly to ‘compare’?” Well, it’s simple, the CMP instruction is the same thing as the SUB instruction, in that, it substracts one operand from another, but the difference is that it doesn’t store the result anywhere. However, it does get your flags updated in the FLAGS register. For example, if I wanted to compare %EAX register with the value ‘2’, and %EAX contains the value 3, this is what’s going to happen: you will substract 2 from the value, the result will be 1, but you don’t care about that, what you care about is that the ZF (Zero flag) is not set, and the SF (Sign flag is not set), which means that %eax and ‘2’ are not equal (otherwise, ZF would be set), and that the value in %eax is superior to 2 (because SF is not set), so you know that “%eax > 2” and that’s what the CMP does.

The TEST instruction is very similar but it does a logical AND on the two operands for testing, so it’s used for comparing logical values instead of arithmetic values (“TEST %eax, 1” can be used to check if %eax contains an odd or even number for example).

This is useful because the next bunch of instructions I explained in the list above is conditional Jump instructions, like “JZ” (jump if zero) or “JB” (jump if below), or “JS” (jump if sign), etc. This is what is used to implement “if, for, while, switch/case, etc.” it’s as simple as doing a “CMP” followed by a “JZ” or “JNZ” or “JB”, “JA”, “JS”, etc.

And if you’re wondering what’s the difference between a “Jump if below” and “Jump if sign” and “Jump if lower”, since they all mean that the comparison gave a negative result, right? Well, the “jump if below” is used for unsigned integers, while “jump if lower” is used for signed integers, while “jump if sign” can be misleading. An unsigned 3 – 4 would give us a very high positive result…  something like that, in practice, JB checks the Carry Flag, while JS checks the Sign Flag and JL checks if the Sign Flag is equal to the Overflow flag. See the Conditional Jump page for more details.

A practical example

Here’s a very small and simple practical example, if you have a simple C program like this:

int main() {
   return add_a_and_b(2, 3);

int add_a_and_b(int a, int b) {
   return a + b;

It would compile into something like this:

   push   3                ; Push the second argument '3' into the stack
   push   2                ; Push the first argument '2' into the stack
   call   _add_a_and_b     ; Call the _add_a_and_b function. This will put the address of the next
                           ; instruction (add) into the stack, then it will jump into the _add_a_and_b
                           ; function by putting the address of the first instruction in the _add_a_and_b
                           ; label (push %ebx) into the EIP register
   add    %esp, 8          ; Add 8 to the esp, which effectively pops out the two values we just pushed into it
   ret                     ; Return to the parent function.... 

   push   %ebx             ; We're going to modify %ebx, so we need to push it to the stack
                           ; so we can restore its value when we're done
   mov    %eax, [%esp+8]   ; Move the first argument (8 bytes above the stack pointer) into EAX
   mov    %ebx, [%esp+12]  ; Move the second argument (12 bytes above the stack pointer) into EBX
   add    %eax, %ebx       ; Add EAX and EBX and store the result into EAX
   pop    %ebx             ; Pop EBX to restore its previous value
   ret                     ; Return back into the main. This will pop the value on the stack (which was
                           ; the address of the next instruction in the main function that was pushed into
                           ; the stack when the 'call' instruction was executed) into the EIP register

Yep, something as simple as that, can be quite complicated in assembly. Well, it’s not really that complicated actually, but a couple of things can be confusing.

You have only 7 usable registers, and one stack. Every function gets its arguments passed through the stack, and can return its return value through the %eax register. If every function modified every register, then your code will break, so every function has to ensure that the other registers are unmodified when it returns (other than %eax). You pass the arguments on the stack and your return value through %eax, so what should you do if need to use a register in your function? Easy: you keep a copy on the stack of any registers you’re going to modify so you can restore them at the end of your function. In the _add_a_and_b function, I did that for the %ebx register as you can see. For more complex function, it can get a lot more complicated than that, but let’s not get into that for now (for the curious: compilers will create what we call a “prologue” and an “epilogue” in each function. In the prologue, you store the registers you’re going to modify, set up the %ebp (base pointer) register to point to the base of the stack when your function was entered, which allows you to access things without keeping track of the pushes/pops you do throughout the function, then in the epilogue, you pop the registers back, restore %esp to the value that was saved in %ebp, before you return).

The second thing you might be wondering about is with these lines:

mov %eax, [%esp+8]
mov %ebx, [%esp+12]

And to explain it, I will simply show you this drawing of the stack’s contents when we call those two instructions above:

For the purposes of this exercise, we’re going to assume that the _main function is located in memory at the address 0xFFFF0000, and that each instructoin is 4 bytes long (the size of each instruction can vary depending on the instruction and on its operands). So you can see, we first pushed 3 into the stack, %esp was lowered, then we pushed 2 into the stack, %esp was lowered, then we did a ‘call _add_a_and_b’, which stored the address of the next instruction (4 instructions into the main, so ‘_main+16’) into the stack and esp was lowered, then we pushed %ebx, which I assumed here contained a value of 0, and the %esp was lowered again. If we now wanted to access the first argument to the function (2), we need to access %esp+8, which will let us skip the saved %ebx and the ‘Return address’ that are in the stack (since we’re working with 32 bits, each value is 4 bytes). And in order to access the second argument (3), we need to access %esp+12.

Binary or assembly?

One question that may (or may not) be popping into your mind now is “wait, isn’t this supposed to be the ‘computer language’, so why isn’t this binary?” Well, it is… in a way. As I explained earlier, “the assembly language is a textual representation of the binary instructions given to the microprocessor”, what it means is that those instructions are given to the processor as is, there is no transformation of the instructions or operands or anything like that. However, the instructions are given to the microprocessor in binary form, and the text you see above is just the textual representation of it.. kind of like how “68 65 6c 6c 6f” is the hexadecimal representation of the ASCII text “hello”. What this means is that each instruction in assembly language, which we call a ‘mnemonic’ represents a binary instruction, which we call an ‘opcode’, and you can see the opcodes and mnemonics in the list of x86 instructions I gave you above. Let’s take the CALL instruction for example. The opcode/mnemonic list is shown as:

Opcode Mnemonic Description
E8 cw CALL rel16 Call near, relative, displacement relative to next instruction
E8 cd CALL rel32 Call near, relative, displacement relative to next instruction
FF /2 CALL r/m16 Call near, absolute indirect, address given in r/m16
FF /2 CALL r/m32 Call near, absolute indirect, address given in r/m32
9A cd CALL ptr16:16 Call far, absolute, address given in operand
9A cp CALL ptr16:32 Call far, absolute, address given in operand
FF /3 CALL m16:16 Call far, absolute indirect, address given in m16:16
FF /3 CALL m16:32 Call far, absolute indirect, address given in m16:32

This means that this same “CALL” mnemonic can have multiple addresses to call. Actually, there are four different possitiblities, each having a 16 bits and a 32 bits variant. The first possibility is to call a function with a relative displacement (Call the function 100 bytes below this current position), or an absolute address given in a register (Call the function whose address is stored in %eax) or an absolute address given as a pointer (Call the function at address 0xFFFF0100), or an absolute address given as an offset to a segment (I won’t explain segments now). In our example above, the “call _add_a_and_b” was probably stored as a call relative to the current position with 12 bytes below the current instruction (4 bytes per instruction, and we have the CALL, ADD, RET instructions to skip). This means that the instruction in the binary file was encoded as “E8 00 00 00 0C” (The E8 opcode to mean a “CALL near, relative”, and the “00 00 00 0C” to mean 12 bytes relative to the current instruction). Now, the most observant of you have probably noticed that this CALL instruction takes 5 bytes total, not 4, but as I said above, we will assume it’s 4 bytes per instruction just for the sake of keeping things simple, but yes, the CALL (in this case) is 5 bytes, and other instructions will sometimes have more or less bytes as well.

I chose the CALL function above for example, because I think it’s the least complicated to explain.. other instructions have even more complicated opcodes and operands (See the ADD and ADC (Add with Cary) instructions for example, you’ll notice the same opcodes shared between them even, so they are the same instruction, but it’s easy to give them separate mnemonics to differentiate their behaviors).

Here’s a screenshot showing a side by side view of the Assembly of a function with the hexadecimal view of the binary:

As you can see, I have my cursor on address 0xFFF6E1D6 on the assembly view on the left, which is also highlighted on the hex view on the right. That address is a CALL instruction, and you can see the equivalent hex of “E8 B4 00 00 00”, which means it’s a CALL near, relative (E8 being the opcode for it) and the function is 0xB4 (180) bytes below our current position of 0xFFF6E1D6.

If you open the file with a hexadecimal editor, you’ll only see the hex view on the right, but you need to put the file into a Disassembler (such as the IDA disassembler which I’m using here, but there are cheaper alternatives as well, the list can be long), and the disassembler will interpret those binary opcodes to show you the textual assembly representation which is much much easier to read.

Some actual reverse engineering

Now that you have the basics, let’s do a quick reverse engineering exercise… This is a very simple function that I’ve reversed recently, it comes from the SiliconInit part of the FSP, and it’s used to validated the UPD configuration structure (used to tell it what to do).

Here is the Assembly code for that function:

This was disassembled using IDA 7.0 (The Interactive DisAssembler) which is an incredible (but expensive) piece of software. There are other disassemblers which can do similar jobs, but I prefer IDA personally. Let’s first explain what you see on the screen.

On the left side, you see “seg000:FFF40xxx” this means that we are in the segment “seg000” at the address 0xFFF40xxx. I won’t explain what a segment is, because you don’t need to know it. The validate_upd_config function starts at address 0xFFF40311 in the RAM, and there’s not much else to understand. You can see how the address increases from one instruction to the next, it can help you calculate the size in bytes that each instruction takes in RAM for example, if you’re curious of course… (the XOR is 2 bytes, the CMP is 2 bytes, etc.).

As you’ve seen in my previous example, anything after a semicolon (“;”) is considered a comment and can be ignored. The “CODE XREF” comments are added by IDA to tell us that this code has a cross-references (is being called by) some other code. So when you see “CODE XREF: validate_upd_config+9” (at 0xFF40363, the RETN instruction), it means this instruction is being called (referenced by) from the function validate_upd_config and the “+9” means 9 bytes into the function (so since the function starts at 0xFFF40311, it means it’s being called from the instruction at offset 0xFFF4031A. The little “up” arrow next to it means that it comes from above the current position in the code, and if you follow the grey lines on the left side of the screen, you can follow that call up to the address 0xFFF4031A which contains the instruction “jnz short locret_FFF40363”. I assume the “j” letter right after the up arrow is to tell us that the reference comes from a “jump” instruction.

As you can see in the left side of the screen, there are a lot of arrows, that means that there’s a lot of jumping around in the code, even though it’s not immediatly obvious. The awesome IDA software has a “layout view” which gives us a much nicer view of the code, and it looks like this:

Now you can see each block of code separately in their own little boxes, with arrows linking all of the boxes together whenever a jump happens. The green arrows mean that it’s a conditional jump when the condition is successful, while the red arrows means the condition was not successful. This means that a “JZ” will show a green arrow towards the code it would jump to if the result is indeed zero, and a red arrow towards the block where the result is not zero. A blue arrow means that it’s an unconditional jump.

I usually always do my reverse engineering using the layout view, I find it much easier to read/follow, but for the purpose of this exercise, I will use the regular linear view instead, so I think it will be easier for you to follow with that instead. The reason is mostly because the layout view doesn’t display the address of each instruction, and it’s easier to have you follow along if I can point out exactly which instruction I’m looking it by mentioning its address.

Now that you know how to read the assembly code, you understand the various instructions, I feel you should be ready to reverse engineering this very simple assembly code (even though it might seem complex at first). I just need to give you the following hints first:

  • Because I’ve already reversed engineering it, you get the beautiful name “validate_upd_config” for the function, but technically, it was simply called “sub_FFF40311”
  • I had already reverse engineered the function that called it so I know that this function is receiving its arguments in an unusual way. The arguments aren’t pushed to the stack, instead, the first argument is stored in %ecx, and the second argument is stored in %edx
  • The first argument (%ecx, remember?) is an enum to indicate what type of UPD structure to validate, let me help you out and say that type ‘3’ is the FSPM_UPD (The configuration structure for the FSPM, the MemoryInit function), and that type ‘5’ is the FSPS_UPD (The configuration structure for the FSPS, the SiliconInit function).
  • Reverse engineering is really about reading one line at a time, in a sequential manner, keep track of which blocks you reversed and be patient. You can’t look at it and expect to understand the function by viewing the big picture.
  • It is very very useful in this case to have a dual monitor, so you can have one monitor for the assembly, and the other monitor for your C code editor. In my case, I actually recently bought an ultra-wide monitor and I split screen between my IDA window and my emacs window and it’s great. It’s hard otherwise to keep going back and forth between the assembly and the C code. That being said, I would suggest you do the same thing here and have a window on the side showing you the assembly image above (not the layout view) while you read the explanation on how to reverse engineer it below.

Got it? All done? No? Stop sweating and hyperventilating… I’ll explain exactly how to reverse engineer this function in the next paragraph, and you will see how simple it turns out to be!

Let’s get started!

The first thing I do is write the function in C. Since I know the name and its arguments already, I’ll do that:

void validate_upd_config (uint8_t action, void *config) {

Yeah, there’s not much to it yet, and I set it to return “void” because I don’t know if it returns anything else, and I gave the first argument “action” as a “uint8_t” because in the parent function it’s used a single byte register (I won’t explain for now how to differentiate 1-byte, 2-bytes, 4-bytes and 8-bytes registers). The second argument is a pointer, but I don’t know it’s a pointer to what kind of structure exactly, so I just set it as a void *.

The first instruction is a “xor eax, eax”. What does this do? It XORs the eax register with the eax register and stores the result in the eax register itself, which is the same thing as “mov eax, 0”, because 1 XOR 1= 0 and 0 XOR 0 = 0, so if every bit in the eax register is logically XORed with itself, it will give 0 for the result. If you’re asking yourself “Why did the compiler decide to do ‘xor eax, eax’ instead of ‘mov eax, 0’ ?” then the answer is simple: “Because it takes less CPU clock cycles to do a XOR, than to do a move”, which means it’s more optimized and it will run faster. Besides, the XOR takes 2 bytes as you can see above (the address of the instructions jumped from FFF40311 to FFF40313), while a “mov eax, 0” would have taken 5 bytes. So it also helps keep the code smaller.

Alright, so now we know that eax is equal to 0, let’s keep that in mind and move along (I like to keep track of things like that as comments in my C code). Next instruction does a “cmp ecx, 3”, so it’s comparing ecx, which we already know is our first argument (uint8_t action), ok, it’s a comparison, not much to do here, again let’s keep that in mind and continue… the next instruction does a “jnz short loc_FFF40344”, which is more interesting, so if the previous comparison is NOT ZERO, then jump to the label loc_FFF40344 (for now ignore the “short”, it just helps us differentiate between the various mnemonics, and it means that the jump is a relative offset that fits in a “short word” which means 2 bytes, and you can confirm that the jnz instruction does indeed take only 2 bytes of code). Great, so there’s a jump if the result is NOT ZERO, which means that if the result is zero, the code will just continue, which means if the ecx register (action variable) is EQUAL (substraction is zero) to 3, the code will continue down to the next instruction instead of jumping… let’s do that, and in the meantime we’ll update our C code:

void validate_upd_config (uint8_t action, void *config) {
   // eax = 0
   if (action == 3) {
      // 0xFFF40318 
   } else {
      // loc_FFF40344

The next instruction is “test edx, edx”.  We know that the edx register is our second argument which is the pointer to the configuration structure. As I explained above, the “test” is just like a comparison, but it does an AND instead of a substraction, so basically, you AND edx with itself.. well, of course, that has no consequence, 1 AND 1 = 1, and 0 AND 0 = 0, so why is it useful to test a register against itself? Simply because the TEST will update our FLAGS register… so when the next instruction is “JZ” it basically means “Jump if the edx register was zero”… And yes, doing a “TEST edx, edx”  is more optimized than doing a “CMP edx, 0”, you’re starting to catch on, yeay!

And indeed, the next instruction is “jz locret_FFF40363”, so if the edx register is ZERO, then jump to locret_FFF40363, and if we look at that locret_FFF40363, it’s a very simple “retn” instruction. So our code becomes:

void validate_upd_config (uint8_t action, void *config) {
  // eax = 0
  if (action == 3) {
    if (config == NULL)
  } else {
    // loc_FFF40344

Next! Now it gets slightly more complicated… the instruction is: “cmp dword ptr [edx], 554C424Bh”, which means we do a comparison of a dword (4 bytes), of the data pointed to by the pointer edx, with no offset (“[edx]” is the same as saying “edx[0]” if it was a C array for example), and we compare it to the value 554C424Bh… the “h” at the end means it’s a hexadecimal value, and with experience you can quickly notice that the hexadecimal value is all within the ASCII range, so using a Hex to ASCII converter, we realize that those 4 bytes represent the ASCII letters “KBLU” (which is why I manually added them as a comment to that instruction, so I won’t forget). So basically the instruction compares the first 4 bytes of the structure (the content pointed to by the edx pointer) to the string “KBLU”. The next instruction does a “jnz loc_FFF4035E” which means that if the comparison result is NOT ZERO (so, if they are not equal) we jump to loc_FFF4035E.

Instead of continuing sequentially, I will see what that loc_FFF4035E contains (of course, I did the same thing in all the previous jumps, and had to decide if I wanted to continue reverse engineering the jump or the next instruction, in this case, it seems better for me to jump, you’ll see why soon). The loc_FFF4035E label contains the following instruction: “mov, eax, 80000002h”, which means it stores the value 0x80000002 into the eax register, and then it jumps to (not really, it just naturally flows to the next instruction which happens to be the label) locret_FFF40363, which is just a “retn”. This makes our code into this:

uint32_t validate_upd_config (uint8_t action, void *config) {
  // eax = 0
  if (action == 3) {
    if (config == NULL)
       return 0; 
    if (((uint32_t *)config)[0] != 0x554C524B)
       return 0x80000002;
  } else {
    // loc_FFF40344

The observant here will notice that I’ve changed the function prototype to return a uint32_t instead of “void” and my previous “return” has become “return 0” and the new code has a “return 0x80000002”. That’s because I realized at this point that the “eax” register is used to return a uint32_t value. And since the first instruction was “xor eax, eax”, and we kept in the back of our mind that “eax is initialized to 0”, it means that the use case with the (config == NULL) will return 0. That’s why I made all these changes…

Very well, let’s go back to where we were, since we’ve exhausted this jump, we’ll jump back in reverse to go back to the address FFF40322 and continue from there to the next instruction. It’s a “cmp dword ptr [edx+4], 4D5F4450h”, which compares the dword at edx+4 to 0x4D5F4450, which I know to be the ASCII for “PD_M”; this means that the last 3 instructions are used to compare the first 8 bytes of our pointer to “KBLUPD_M”… ohhh, light bulb above our heads, it’s comparing the pointer to the Signature of the FSPM_UPD structure (don’t forget, you weren’t supposed to know that the function is called validate_upd_config, or that the argument is a config pointer… just that it’s a pointer)! OK, now it makes sense, and while we’re at it—and since we are, of course, reading the FSP integration guide PDF, we then also realize what the 0x80000002 actually means. At this point, our code now becomes:

EFI_STATUS validate_upd_config (uint8_t action, void *config) {
  if (action == 3) {
    FSPM_UPD *upd = (FSPM_UPD *) config;
    if (upd == NULL)
       return EFI_SUCCESS; 
    if (upd->FspUpdHeader.Signature != 0x4D5F4450554C524B /* 'KBLUPD_M'*/)
  } else {
    // loc_FFF40344

Yay, this is starting to look like something… Now you probably got the hang of it, so let’s do things a little faster now.

  • The next line “cmp [edx+28h], eax” compares edx+0x28 to eax. Thankfully, we know now that edx points to the FSPM_UPD structure, and we can calculate that at offset 0x28 inside that structure, it’s the field StackBase within the FspmArchUpd field…
  • and also, we still have in the back of our minds that ‘eax’ is initialized to zero, so, we know that the next 2 instructions are just checking if upd->FspmArchUpd.StackBase is == NULL.
  • Then we compare the StackSize with 0x26000, but the comparison is using “jb” for the jump, which is “jump if below”, so it checks if StackSize < 0x26000,
  • finally it does a “test” with “edx+30h” (which is the BootloaderTolumSize field) and 0xFFF, then it does an unconditional jump to loc_FFF4035C, which itself does a “jz” to the return..
  • which means if (BootloaderTolumSize  & 0xFFF  == 0) it will return whatever EAX contained (which is zero),
  • but if it doesn’t, then it will continue to the next instruction which is the “mov eax, 80000002h”.

So, we end up with this code:

EFI_STATUS validate_upd_config (uint8_t action, void *config) {
  // eax = 0
  if (action == 3) {
    FSPM_UPD *upd = (FSPM_UPD *) config;
    if (upd == NULL)
       return 0;
    if (upd->FspUpdHeader.Signature != 0x4D5F4450554C524B /* 'KBLUPD_M'*/)
    if (upd->FspmArchUpd.StackBase == NULL)
    if (upd->FspmArchUpd.StackSize < 0x2600)
    if (upd->FspmArchUpd.BootloaderTolumSize & 0xFFF)
  } else {
    // loc_FFF40344
  return EFI_SUCCESS

Great, we just solved half of our code! Don’t forget, we jumped one way instead of another at the start of the function, now we need to go back up and explore the second branch of the code (at offset 0xFFF40344). The code is very similar, but it checks for “KBLUPD_S” Signature, and nothing else. Now we can also remove any comment/notes we have (such as the note that eax is initialized to 0) and clean up, and simplify the code if there is a need.

So our function ends up being (this is the final version of the function):

EFI_STATUS validate_upd_config (uint8_t action, void *config) {
  if (action == 3) {
    FSPM_UPD *upd = (FSPM_UPD *) config;
    if (upd == NULL)
       return EFI_SUCCESS;
    if (upd->FspUpdHeader.Signature != 0x4D5F4450554C524B /* 'KBLUPD_M'*/)
    if (upd->FspmArchUpd.StackBase == NULL)
    if (upd->FspmArchUpd.StackSize < 0x2600)
    if (upd->FspmArchUpd.BootloaderTolumSize & 0xFFF)
  } else {
    FSPS_UPD *upd = (FSPS_UPD *) config;
    if (upd == NULL)
        return EFI_SUCCESS;
    if (upd->FspUpdHeader.Signature != 0x535F4450554C524B /* 'KBLUPD_S'*/)
  return EFI_SUCCESS

Now this wasn’t so bad, was it? I mean, it’s time consuming, sure, it can be a little disorienting if you’re not used to it, and you have to keep track of which branches (which blocks in the layout view) you’ve already gone through, etc. but the function turned out to be quite small and simple. After all, it was mostly only doing CMP/TEST and JZ/JNZ.

That’s pretty much all I do when I do my reverse engineering, I go line by line, I understand what it does, I try to figure out how it fits into the bigger picture, I write equivalent C code to keep track of what I’m doing and to be able to understand what happens, so that I can later figure out what the function does exactly… Now try to imagine doing that for hundreds of functions, some of them that look like this (random function taken from the FSPM module):

You can see on the right, the graph overview which shows the entirety of the function layout diagram. The part on the left (the assembly) is represented by the dotted square on the graph overview (near the middle). You will notice some arrows that are thicker than the others, that’s used in IDA to represent loops. On the left side, you can notice one such thick green line coming from the bottom and the arrow pointing to a block inside our view. This means that there’s a jump condition below that can jump back to a block that is above the current block and this is basically how you do a for/while loop with assembly, it’s just a normal jump that points backwards instead of forwards.

Finally, the challenge!

At the beginning of this post, I mentioned a challenging function to reverse engineer. It’s not extremely challenging—it’s complex enough that you can understand the kind of things I have to deal with sometimes, but it’s simple enough that anyone who was able to follow up until now should be able to understand it (and maybe even be able to reverse engineer it on their own).

So, without further ado, here’s this very simple function:

Since I’m a very nice person, I renamed the function so you won’t know what it does, and I removed my comments so it’s as virgin as it was when I first saw it. Try to reverse engineer it. Take your time, I’ll wait:

Alright, so, the first instruction is a “call $+5”, what does that even mean?

  1. When I looked at the hex dump, the instruction was simply “E8 00 00 00 00” which according to our previous CALL opcode table means “Call near, relative, displacement relative to next instruction”, so it wants to call the instruction 0 bytes from the next instruction. Since the call opcode itself is taking 5 bytes, that means it’s doing a call to its own function but skipping the call itself, so it’s basically jumping to the “pop eax”, right? Yes…  but it’s not actually jumping to it, it’s “calling it”, which means that it just pushed into the stack the return address of the function… which means that our stack contains the address 0xFFF40244 and our next instruction to be executed is the one at the address 0xFFF40244. That’s because, if you remember, when we do a “ret”, it will pop the return address from the stack into the EIP (instruction pointer) register, that’s how it knows where to go back when the function finishes.
  2. So, then the instruction does a “pop eax” which will pop that return address into EAX, thus removing it from the stack and making the call above into a regular jump (since there is no return address in the stack anymore).
  3. Then it does a “sub eax, 0FFF40244h”, which means it’s substracting 0xFFF40244 from eax (which should contain 0xFFF40244), so eax now contains the value “0”, right? You bet!
  4. Then it adds to eax, the value “0xFFF4023F”, which is the address of our function itself. So, eax now contains the value 0xFFF4023F.
  5. It will then substract from EAX, the value pointed to by [eax-15], which means the dword (4 bytes) value at the offset 0xFFF4023F – 0xF, so the value at 0xFFF40230, right… that value is 0x1AB (yep, I know, you didn’t have this information)… so, 0xFFF4023F – 0x1AB = 0xFFF40094!
  6. And then the function returns.. with the value 0xFFF40094 in EAX, so it returns 0xFFF40094, which happens to be the pointer to the FSP_INFO_HEADER structure in the binary.

So, the function just returns 0xFFF40094, but why did it do it in such a convoluted way? The reason is simple: because the FSP-S code is technically meant to be loaded in RAM at the address 0xFFF40000, but it can actually reside anywhere in the RAM when it gets executed. Coreboot for example doesn’t load it in the right memory address when it executes it, so instead of returning the wrong address for the structure and crashing (remember, most of the jumps and calls use relative addresses, so the code should work regardless of where you put it in memory, but in this case returning the wrong address for a structure in memory wouldn’t work), the code tries to dynamically verify if it has been relocated and if it is, it will calculate how far away it is from where it’s supposed to be, and calculate where in memory the FSP_INFO_HEADER structure ended up being.

Here’s the explanation why:

  • If the FSP was loaded into a different memory address, then the “call $+5” would put the exact memory address of the next instruction into the stack, so when you pop it into eax then substract from it the expected address 0xFFF40244, this means that eax will contain the offset from where it was supposed to be.
  • Above, we said eax would be equal to zero, yes, that’s true, but only in the usecase where the FSP is in the right memory address, as expected, otherwise, eax would simply contain the offset. Then you add to it 0xFFFF4023F which is the address of our function, and with the offset, that means eax now contains the exact memory address of the current function, wherever it was actually placed in RAM!
  • Then when it grabs the value 0x1AB (because that value is stored in RAM 15 bytes before the start of the function, that will work just fine) and substracts it from our current position, it gives us the address in RAM of the FSP_INFO_HEADER (because the compiler knows that the structure is located exactly 0x1AB bytes before the current function). This just makes everything be relative.

Isn’t that great!? 😉 It’s so simple, but it does require some thinking to figure out what it does and some thinking to understand why it does it that way… but then you end up with the problem of “How do I write this in C”? Honestly, I don’t know how, I just wrote this in my C file:

// Use Position-independent code to make this relocatable
void *get_fsp_info_header() {
    return 0xFFF40094; 

I think the compiler takes care of doing all that magic on its own when you use the -fPIC compiler option (for gcc), which means “Position-Independent Code”.

What this means for Purism

On my side, I’ve finished reverse engineering the FSP-S entry code—from the entry point (FspSiliconInit) all the way to the end of the function and all the subfunctions that it calls.

This only represents 9 functions however, and about 115 lines of C code; I haven’t yet fully figured out where exactly it’s going in order to execute the rest of the code. What happens is that the last function it calls (it actually jumps into it) grabs a variable from some area in memory, and within that variable, it will copy a value into the ESP, thus replacing our stack pointer, and then it does a “RETN”… which means that it’s not actually returning to the function that called it (coreboot), it’s returning… “somewhere”, depending on what the new stack contains, but I don’t know where (or how) this new stack is created, so I need to track it down in order to find what the return address is, find where the “retn” is returning us into, so I can unlock plenty of new functions and continue reverse engineering this.

I’ve already made some progress on that front (I know where the new stack tells us to return into) but you will have to wait until my next blog post before I can explain it all to you. It’s long and complicated enough that it needs its own post, and this one is long enough already.

Other stories from strange lands

You never really know what to expect when you start reverse engineering assembly. Here are some other stories from my past experiences.

  • I once spent a few days reverse engineering a function until about 30% of it when I finally realized that the function was… the C++ “+ operator” of the std::string class (which by the way, with the use of C++ templates made it excruciatingly hard to understand)!
  • I once had to reverse engineer over 5000 lines of assembly code that all resolved into… 7 lines of C code. The code was for creating a hash and it was doing a lot of manipulation on data with different values on every iteration. There was a LOT of xor, or, and, shifting left and right of data, etc., which took maybe a hundred or so lines of assembly and it was all inside a loop, which the compiler decided that—to optimize it—it would unravel the loop (this means that instead of doing a jmp, it will just copy-paste the same code again), so instead of having to reverse engineer the code once and then see that it’s a loop that runs 64 times, I had to reverse engineer the same code 64 times because it was basically getting copy-pasted by the compiler in a single block but the compiler was “nice” enough that it was using completely different registers for every repetition of the loop, and the data was getting shifted in a weird way and using different constants and different variables at every iteration, and—as if that wasn’t enough— every 1/4th of the loop, changing the algorithm and making it very difficult to predict the pattern, forcing me to completely reverse engineer the 5000+ assembly lines into C, then slowly refactor and optimize the C code until it became that loop with 7 lines of code inside it… If you’re curious you can see the code here at line 39, where there is some operation common to all iterations, then 4 different operations depending on which iteration we are doing, and the variables used for each operation changes after each iteration (P, PP, PPP and PPPP get swapped every time), and the constant values and the indices used are different for each iteration as well (see constants.h). It was complicated and took a long while to reverse engineer.
  • Below is the calling graph of the PS3 firmware I worked on some years ago. All of these functions have been entirely reverse engineered (each black rectangle is actually an entire function, and the arrows show which function calls which other function), and the result was the ps3xport tool. As you can see, sometimes a function can be challenging to reverse, and sometimes a single function can call so many nested functions that it can get pretty complicated to keep track of what is doing what and how everything fits together. That function at the top of the graph was probably very simple, but it brought with it so much complexity because of a single “call”:

Perseverance prevails

In conclusion:

  • Reverse engineering isn’t just about learning a new language, it’s a very different experience from “learning Java/Python/Rust after you’ve mastered C”, because of the way it works; it can sometimes be very easy and boring, sometimes it will be very challenging for a very simple piece of code.
  • It’s all about perseverance, being very careful (it’s easy to get lost or make a mistake, and very hard to track down and fix a mistake/typo if you make one), and being very patient. We’re talking days, weeks, months. That’s why reverse engineering is something that very few people do (compared to the number of people who do general software development). Remember also that our first example was 82 bytes of code, and the second one was only 19 bytes long, and most of the time, when you need to reverse engineer something, it’s many hundreds of KBs of code.

All that being said, the satisfaction you get when you finish reverse engineering some piece of code, when you finally understand how it works and can reproduce its functionality with open source software of your own, cannot be described with words. The feeling of achievement that you get makes all the efforts worth it!

I hope this write-up helps everyone get a fresh perspective on what it means to “reverse engineer the code”, why it takes so long, and why it’s rare to find someone with the skills, experience and patience to do this kind of stuff for months—as it can be frustrating, and we sometimes need to take a break from it and do something else in order to renew our brain cells.

Trusted Platform Module now available as an add-on for Librem laptops

Over the past few months, we have been busy with a plethora of great projects being set afoot. We have been incrementally building a laptop inventory to ship from, we have been continuing the coreboot enablement work on our laptops, neutralizing—and then disabling—the Intel Management Engine, and launching our much awaited Librem phone campaign, which ended in a very motivating success—involving many great organizations part of the Free Software community, such as Matrix, KDE e.v., the GNOME Foundation, Nextcloud, and Monero.

It really has been a whirlwind of events, and this has been happening in parallel to us continuing our existing R&D and operations work, such as preparing a new batch of laptops—namely the much anticipated Librem 13 with i7 processor.

One particular security R&D project dear to our hearts has been the beginning of our collaboration with “Heads” developer Trammell Hudson, a project that has been quietly going on behind the scenes for the past few months. We are very pleased to announce today that we are making a positive step to make this effort within reach of early adopters, with the availability of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as an optional component for currently pending and near-future laptop orders. Read more

Running Plasma Mobile on an i.MX 6 test board

On the road to a working mobile phone, doing some initial evaluation and testing of the current state of existing user interfaces and frameworks is key, to evaluate what can readily serve as building blocks and what needs work. Last weekend I did an initial experiment in getting Plasma Mobile working on our i.MX 6 based test development board, using a 4.13.5 Linux kernel and stock Debian Testing. Initially, I encountered a few problems with KWin not wanting to start a Wayland compositor due to not recognizing the device as OpenGL ES 2.0 capable and also not finding a few needed OpenGL extensions. After some digging and with help from Plasma Mobile developer Bhushan Shah we tracked this issue down to a bug in libepoxy that was solved a long time ago. Unfortunately, Debian’s packaged version of this library was very old, so I upgraded it to a newer version manually (and we will get it updated in Debian soon). This resulted in a working Plasma Shell on the device.

The next step was compiling and installing the Plasma Mobile components from current Git master repository and running the mobile shell. This initially led to graphical glitches in the display, which were caused by KWin running as root (which you should never do as a user, but I did not think this would also cause major issues just for testing whether the shell works or not). After switching to a regular user for running the KWin wayland compositor and removing a dead call to upstart from the plasma-phone launch script, I could start the Plasma Mobile/Phone shell with the kwin_wayland --drm --xwayland plasma-phone command.

Here are the screenshots you have probably been waiting for the whole time:

Plasma Mobile on i.MX 6 main view
Plasma Mobile on i.mx6 running the Discover application center
Plasma Mobile on i.mx6 App drawer

Of course this is not a final product, by any stretch of the imagination. It’s simply a test to see that it runs. There is a lot to do in terms of performance improvements, as Plasma Mobile still runs pretty slow on this kind of hardware (which could be less of a problem in case we use the i.MX 8 platform). Also, these initial tests were done using recent—but not the most up to date—versions of Plasma, KDE Framework and Qt (KWin/Plasma 5.10.5, KF 5.37.0, Qt 5.9.1), while a lot of performance improvements and bug fixes went into the latest versions. So it is definitely worth switching as soon as possible to tracking KDE’s latest development releases to benefit early from improvements done in the whole stack.

In general, Plasma Mobile already provides a usable (albeit alpha-quality) mobile interface today. The Qt Quick/QML based Kirigami component library and interface guidelines also provide a nice framework for mobile application developers, that have been tested on Android as well, and works nicely on and with the Plasma Mobile shell.

We are looking forward to seeing what we can do with the Plasma Mobile shell in future. Many thanks to Bhushan and the KDE community for helping with some issues encountered when making Plasma work on the i.MX 6, and their plans on making a real Plasma Mobile alpha release soon. If you are interested in the Plasma Mobile roadmap, this recent post from Sebastian Kügler might be interesting for you.

Purism Librem Laptops Completely Disable Intel’s Management Engine

SAN FRANCISCO, Calif., October 19, 2017 — Purism’s Librem Laptops, running coreboot, are now available with the Intel Management Engine completely and verifiably disabled.

“Disabling the Management Engine, long believed to be impossible, is now possible and available in all current Librem laptops, it is also available as a software update for previously shipped recent Librem laptops.” says Todd Weaver, Founder & CEO of Purism.

The Management Engine (ME), part of Intel AMT, is a separate CPU that can run and control a computer even when powered off. The ME has been the bane of the security market since 2008 on all Intel based CPUs, with publicly released exploits against it, is now disabled by default on all Purism Librem laptops.

Disabling the Management Engine is no easy task, and it has taken security researchers years to find a way to properly and verifiably disable it. Purism, because it runs coreboot and maintains its own BIOS firmware update process has been able to release and ship coreboot that disables the Management Engine from running, directly halting the ME CPU without the ability of recovery.

“Purism Librem laptops were already the most secure current Intel based computers available on the market today, but disabling the management engine solidifies that statement clearly.” says Zlatan Todoric, CTO of Purism.

The Librem 13 and Librem 15 products can be purchased today and will arrive with the Management Engine disabled by default, and it can be verified to be disabled with the source code released to confirm the disablement is accurate. Showing “ME: FW Partition Table : BAD; ME: Bringup Loader Failure : YES”

“Purism, in the long-term pursuit of liberating hardware at the lowest levels, still has more work to do. Removing the management engine entirely is the next step beyond just disabling it. Coreboot also includes another binary, the Intel FSP, a less worrisome but still important binary to liberate, incorporating a free vBIOS is another step Purism plans to take. The road to a completely free system on current Intel CPUs is not over, but the largest step of disabling the Management Engine is arguably the largest milestone to cross.” says Youness Alaoui, Hardware Enablement Developer at Purism.

See also: our technical write-up on disabling the Management Engine on Purism laptops.

About Purism

Purism is a Social Purpose Corporation devoted to bringing security, privacy, software freedom, and digital independence to everyone’s personal computing experience. With operations based in San Francisco (California) and around the world, Purism manufactures premium-quality laptops, tablets and phones, creating beautiful and powerful devices meant to protect users’ digital lives without requiring a compromise on ease of use. Purism designs and assembles its hardware in the United States, carefully selecting internationally sourced components to be privacy-respecting and fully Free-Software-compliant. Security and privacy-centric features come built-in with every product Purism makes, making security and privacy the simpler, logical choice for individuals and businesses.

Media Contact

Marie Williams, Coderella / Purism
+1 415-689-4029
See also the Purism press room for additional tools and announcements.

Deep dive into Intel Management Engine disablement

Starting today, our second generation of laptops (based on the 6th gen Intel Skylake platform) will now come with the Intel Management Engine neutralized and disabled by default. Users who already received their orders can also update their flash to disable the ME on their machines.

In this post, I will dig deeper and explain in more details what this means exactly, and why it wasn’t done before today for the laptops that were shipping this spring and summer.

The life and times of the ME

Think of the ME as having 4 possible states:

  1. Fully operational ME: the ME is running normally like it does on other manufacturers’ machines (note that this could be a consumer or corporate ME image, which vary widely in the features they ‘provide’)
  2. Neutralized ME: the ME is neutralized/neutered by removing the most “mission-critical” components from it, such as the kernel and network stack.
  3. Disabled ME: the ME is officially “disabled” and is known to be completely stopped and non-functional
  4. Removed ME: the ME is completely removed and doesn’t execute anything at any time, at all.

In my previous blog post about taming the ME, we discussed how we neutralize the ME (note that this was on the first generation, Broadwell-based Purism laptops back then), but we’ve taken things one step further today by not only neutralizing the ME but also by disabling it. The difference between the two might not be immediately visible to some of you, so I’ll clarify below.

  • A neutralized ME is a ME image which had most of its code removed.
    • The way the ME firmware is packaged on the flash, is in the form of multiple modules, and each module has a specific task, such as : Hardware initialization, Firmware updates, Kernel, Network stack, Audio/Video processing, HECI communication over PCI, Java virtual machine, etc. When the ME is neutralized using the me_cleaner tool, most of the modules will be removed. As we’ve seen on Broadwell, that meant almost 93% of the code is removed and only 7% remains (that proportion is different on Skylake, see further below).
    • A neutralized ME means that the ME firmware will encounter an error during its regular boot cycle; It will not find some of its critical modules and it will throw an error and somehow fail to proceed. However, the ME remains operational, it just can’t do anything “valuable”. While it’s unable to communicate with the main CPU through the HECI commands, the PCI interface to the ME processor is still active and lets us poke at the status of the ME for example, which lets us see which error caused it to stop functioning.
  • When the ME is disabled using the “HAP” method (thanks to the Positive Technologies for discovering this trick), however, it doesn’t throw an error “because it can’t load a module”: it actually stops itself in a graceful manner, by design.

The two approaches are similar in that they both stop the execution of the ME during the hardware initialization (BUP) phase, but with the ME disabled through the HAP method, the ME stops on its own, without putting up a fight, potentially disabling things that the forceful “me_cleaner” approach, with the “unexpected error” state, wouldn’t have disabled. The PCI interface for example, is entirely unable to communicate with the ME processor, and the status of the ME is not even retrievable.

So the big, visible difference for us, between a neutralized and a disabled ME, is that the neutralized ME might appear “normal” when coreboot accesses its status, or it might show that it has terminated due to an error, while a disabled ME simply doesn’t give us a status at all—so coreboot will even think that the ME partition is corrupted. Another advantage, is that, from my understanding of the Positive Technologies’s research, a disabled ME stops its execution before a neutralized ME does, so there is at least a little bit of extra code that doesn’t get executed when the ME is disabled, compared to a neutralized ME.

Kill it with fire! Then dump it into a volcano.

In our case, we went with an ME that is both neutered and disabled. By doing so, we provide maximum security; even if the disablement of the ME isn’t functioning properly, the ME would still fail to load its mission-critical modules and will therefore be safe from any potential exploits or backdoors (unless one is found in the very early boot process of the ME).

I want to talk about the neutralizing of the Skylake ME then follow up on how the ME was disabled. However, I first want you to understand the differences between the ME on Broadwell systems (ME version 10.x) and the ME on Skylake systems (ME version 11.0.x).

  • The Intel Management Engine can be seen as two things; first, the isolated processor core that run the Management Engine is considered “The ME”, and second, the firmware that runs on the ME Core is also considered as being “the ME”. I often used the two terms interchangeably, but to avoid confusion, I will from now on (try to) refer to them, respectively, as the ME Core and the ME Firmware, but note that if I simply say the ME, then I am probably referring to the ME Firmware.
  • The ME Firmware 10.x was used on Broadwell systems which had an ARC core, while the ME Firmware 11.0.x used on Skylake systems uses an x86 core. What this means is that the architecture used by the ME core is completely different (kind of like how PowerPC and Intel macs used a different architecture, or how most mobile devices use an ARM architecture, the Broadwell ME Core used an ARC architecture). This means that the difference between the 10.x and 11.0.x ME firmwares is major, and the cores themselves are also very different. It’s a bit like comparing arabic to korean!
  • As the format of the ME firmware changed significantly, it took a while to figure out how to decompress the modules and understand how to remove the modules without breaking anything else. Nicola Corna, the author of the me_cleaner tool, recently was able to add support for Skylake machines by removing all the non essential modules.

In my last ME-related post, I gave everyone a rundown of the modules that were in the ME 10.x firmware and which ones were remaining after it was neutered, so, for Skylake, here is the list of modules in a regular ME 11.0.x firmware:

-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto 184320 Aug 29 16:33 bup.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  36864 Aug 29 16:33 busdrv.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  32768 Aug 29 16:33 cls.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto 163840 Aug 29 16:33 crypto.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto 389120 Aug 29 16:33 dal_ivm.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  24576 Aug 29 16:33 dal_lnch.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  49152 Aug 29 16:33 dal_sdm.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  16384 Aug 29 16:33 evtdisp.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  16384 Aug 29 16:33 fpf.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  45056 Aug 29 16:33 fwupdate.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  16384 Aug 29 16:33 gpio.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto   8192 Aug 29 16:33 hci.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  36864 Aug 29 16:33 heci.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  28672 Aug 29 16:33 hotham.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  28672 Aug 29 16:33 icc.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  16384 Aug 29 16:33 ipc_drv.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  11832 Aug 29 16:33 ish_bup.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  24576 Aug 29 16:33 ish_srv.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  73728 Aug 29 16:33 kernel.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  28672 Aug 29 16:33 loadmgr.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  28672 Aug 29 16:33 maestro.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  28672 Aug 29 16:33 mca_boot.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  24576 Aug 29 16:33 mca_srv.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  36864 Aug 29 16:33 mctp.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  32768 Aug 29 16:33 nfc.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto 409600 Aug 29 16:33 pavp.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  16384 Aug 29 16:33 pmdrv.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  24576 Aug 29 16:33 pm.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  61440 Aug 29 16:33 policy.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  12288 Aug 29 16:33 prtc.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto 167936 Aug 29 16:33 ptt.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  16384 Aug 29 16:33 rbe.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  12288 Aug 29 16:33 rosm.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  49152 Aug 29 16:33 sensor.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto 110592 Aug 29 16:33 sigma.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  20480 Aug 29 16:33 smbus.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  36864 Aug 29 16:33 storage.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto   8192 Aug 29 16:33 syncman.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  94208 Aug 29 16:33 syslib.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  16384 Aug 29 16:33 tcb.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  28672 Aug 29 16:33 touch_fw.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  12288 Aug 29 16:33 vdm.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  98304 Aug 29 16:33 vfs.mod

And here is the list of modules in a neutered ME :

-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto 184320 Oct  4 16:21 bup.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  73728 Oct  4 16:21 kernel.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  16384 Oct  4 16:21 rbe.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 kakaroto kakaroto  94208 Oct  4 16:21 syslib.mod

The total ME size dropped from 2.5MB to 360KB, which means that 14.42% of the code remains, while 85.58% of the code was neutralized with me_cleaner.

The reason the neutering on Skylake-based systems removed less code than on Broadwell-based systems is because of the code in the ME’s read-only memory (ROM). What this “ROM” means is that a small part of the ME firmware is actually burned in the silicon of the ME Core. The ROM content is the first code executed, loaded internally from the ROM, by the ME core, and it has the simple task of reading the ME firmware from the flash, verifying its signature, making sure it hasn’t been tampered with, loading it in the ME Core’s memory and executing it.

  • On Broadwell, there is about 128KB of code burned in the ME Core’s ROM. That 128KB of code contains the bootloader as well as some system APIs that the other modules can use.
  • On Skylake, the ROM code was decreased to 17KB, leaving only the basic bootloader, and moving the system APIs to a module of their own inside the ME firmware.
  • This means that the total amount of code remaining, including the ROM is 360+17KB out of 2524+17KB = 377/2541 = 14.84% for Skylake, while on Broadwell, it’s 120 + 128KB out of 1624+128KB = 248/1752 = 14.15% of code remaining. The difference is much smaller now when we account for the code hidden in the ROM of the processor.

The problem with the code in the ROM is that it cannot be removed because it’s inside of the processor itself and, well, it’s Read-Only Memory—it cannot be overwritten in any way, by definition. On the bright side, it is nice to see that most of the code that was previously in the ROM has now been moved to the flash in Skylake systems.

The ME firmware itself has multiple “partitions”, each containing something that the ME firmware needs. Some of those partitions will contain code modules, some will contain configuration files, and some will contain “other data” (I don’t really know what). Either way, the ME firmware contains about a dozen different partitions, each for a specific purpose, and two of those partitions contain the majority of the code modules.

Schrödinger’s Wi-Fi

I’ll now explain what has been done to get to this point in the project. When I was done with the coreboot port to the new Skylake machines, I tried to neutralize the ME, thinking it would be a breeze, since me_cleaner claimed support for Skylake. Unfortunately, it wasn’t working as it should and I spent the entire hacking day at the coreboot conference trying to fix it.

The problem is that once the ME was neutralized with me_cleaner, the Wi-Fi module on the Librem was unpredictable: it sometimes would work and sometimes wouldn’t, which was confusing. I eventually realized that if I reboot after replacing the ME, the wifi would keep the same state as it was in before:

  • if I neutralized the ME and reboot, it would still work, but after powering off the machine and turning it on, the wifi would stop working;
  • if I restored a full ME (instead of a neutralized one) and rebooted, the wifi would remain dead;
  • …but if I power off the machine and turn it back on, the wifi would finally be restored.

I figured that it has something to do with how the PCI-Express card is initialized, and I spent quite some time trying to “enable it” from coreboot with a neutralized ME. I’ll spare you the details but I eventually realized that I couldn’t get it to work because the PCIe device completely ignored all my commands and would simply refuse to power up. It turns out that the ME controls the ICC (Integrated Clock Controller) so without it, it would simply not enable the clock for the PCIe device, so the wifi card wouldn’t work and there is nothing you can do about it because only the ME has control over the ICC registers. I tried to test a handful of different ME firmware versions, but surprisingly, the wifi module never worked on any of those images, even when the ME was not neutralized. Obviously, it meant that the ME firmware was not properly configured, so I used the Intel FIT tool (which is used to configure ME images, allowing us to set things like PCIe lanes, and which clocks to enable, and all of that). Unfortunately, even when an image was configured the exact same way as the original ME image we had, the wifi would still not work, and I couldn’t figure out why.

I shelved the problem to concentrate on the release of coreboot and eventually on the SATA issues we were experiencing. The decision was made to release the Librem 13 v2 and Librem 15 v3 with a regular ME until more work was done on that front, because we couldn’t hold back shipments any longer (and because we can provide updates after shipment). Also note that at that time, the support for Skylake in me_cleaner was very rough—it was removing only half of the ME code because the format of the new ME 11.x firmware wasn’t fully known yet.

A few weeks later, I saw the release of unME11 from Positive Technologies and a week later, Nicola Corna pushed more complete support for Skylake in a testing branch of me_cleaner. I immediatly jumped on it and tested it on our machines. Unfortunately, the wifi issue was still there. I decided to debug the cause by figuring out what me_cleaner does that could be affecting the ME firmware that way.

As I mentioned earlier in this post, the ME firmware is made up of a dozen of partitions, some of those containing code modules, and me_cleaner will remove all the partitions except one, in which it will remove most of the modules and leave only the critical modules needed for the startup of the system. Therefore, I started progressively whitelisting more modules so me_cleaner wouldn’t remove them, and testing if it affected the wifi module. This was annoying to test because I’d have to change me_cleaner, neutralize the ME firmware, then copy the image from my main PC to the Librem then flash the new image, poweroff, then restart the machine, and if the Wifi wasn’t working, which was 99% of the time, I had to copy the files through a USB drive. I eventually restored all of the modules and it was still not working, which made me suspect the cause might be in one of the other partitions, so I gradually added one partition at a time, until the Wifi suddenly worked. I had just added the “MFS” partition, so I started removing the other partitions again one at a time, but keeping the “MFS” partition, and the Wifi was still working. I eventually removed all of the code modules (apart from the critical ones) but keeping the MFS partition, and the wifi was still working. So I had found my fix: I just need to keep the “MFS” partition in the image and the wifi would work.

So many firmwares, so little time

So, what is this mysterious “MFS” partition? There’s not a lot of information about it anywhere online, other than one forum or mailing list user mentioning the MFS partition as “ME File System”. I decided to use a comparative approach.

The fun thing  when comparing ME firmware images: not only are there multiple versions (ex: 10.x vs 11.x), for each single ME version there are multiple “flavors” of it, such as “Consumer” or “Corporate”, and there are also multiple flavors for “mobile” and “desktop”.

  • When I extracted and compared all the partitions of all the variants and flavors, the only difference between a mobile and a desktop image is in the MFS partition, as every other partition shares the same hash between two flavors of the same version.
  • I then compared the various partitions between a configured and a non configured ME firmware, and noticed that what the Intel FIT tool does when you change the system’s configuration is to simply write that configuration inside of the MFS partition.
  • This means that the MFS partition, which doesn’t contain any code modules, is used for storage of configuration files used by the ME firmware. This is somewhat confirmed by the fact that the MFS partition is marked as containing data.

After modifying me_cleaner to add support for the Librem, which allows us to neutralize the ME while keeping the Wifi module working, I discussed with Nicola Corna how to best integrate the feature into me_cleaner. We came to the conclusion that having a new option to allow users to select which partitions to keep would be a better method, so I sent a pull request that adds such a feature.

Unfortunately, while the wifi module was working with this change, I also had an adverse side-effect when adding the MFS partition back into the ME firmware: my machine would refuse to power off, for example, and would have trouble rebooting.

  • The exact behavior is that if I power off the machine, Linux would do the entire power off sequence then stop, and I would have to manually force shutdown the Librem by holding the power button for 5 seconds. As for the rebooting issue, instead of actually rebooting when Linux finishes its poweroff sequence, the system will be frozen for a few seconds before suddenly shutting itself down forcibly, then turning itself back on 5 seconds later, on its own. This isn’t the most critical of issues, but it would be very annoying to users, and unfortunately, I couldn’t find the cause of this strange behavior. All I knew was that if I remove the MFS partition, coreboot says the ME partition is corrupted, and the wifi module doesn’t work, and if I keep the MFS partition, coreboot says the ME partition is valid, the wifi module works, but the poweroff/reboot issues automatically appear.
  • The solution for these issues turned out to be unexpectedly simple. After another of our developers said he was ready to live with the poweroff/reboot issues, and I sent him a neutralized ME for his system, I was told that his machine was working fine with no side-effects at all. I didn’t know what the difference between his machine and mine was, other than the fact that my machine is a prototype and his was a “production” machine. I then tested my neutralized ME on the “production” Librem 13 unit I had on hand, and I didn’t have any side effects of the neutralizing of the ME firmware. I then updated my coreboot build script to add the neutralization option and asked users on our forums to test it, and every one who tested the neutralized ME reported back success with no side-effects. I then realized the problem is probably only caused by the prototype machine that I was using. Well, I can live with that.

Disabling the ME

The next step for me was to start reverse-engineering the ME firmware, like I had done before. This is of course a very long and arduous process that took a while and for which I don’t really have much progress to show. One thing I wanted to reverse-engineer was the MFS file system format so I could see which configuration files are within it and to start eliminating as much from it as possible. I started from the beginning however, by reverse engineering the entry point in the ROM. I will spare you much of the detail and the troubles in trying to understand some of the instructions, and mostly some of the memory accesses. The important thing to know is that before I got too far along, Positive Technologies announced the discovery of a way to disable the Intel ME, and I needed to test it.

Unfortunately, enabling the HAP bit which disables the ME Core, didn’t work on the Librem: it was causing the power LED to blink very slowly, and nothing I could do would stop it until I removed the battery. I first thought the machine was stuck in a boot loop, but it was just blinking really slowly. I figured out eventually that the reason was that the “HAP” bit was not added in version 11.0.0, but rather in version 11.0.x (where  x > 0). I decided to try a newer ME firmware version and the HAP bit did work on that, which confirmed that the ME disablement was a feature added to the ME after the version the Librem came with ( So now I have a newer ME (version that is disabled thanks to the HAP bit, but… no Wi-Fi again.

I decided to retry using the FIT tool to configure the ME with the exact same settings as the old ME firmware. I went through every setting available to make sure it matches, and when I tried booting it again, the ME Core was disabled and the Wifi module was working. Great Success!

Obviously, I then needed to do plenty of testing, make sure it’s all working as it should, confirm that the ME Core was disabled, test the behavior of the system with a ME firmware both disabled and neutralized, and that it has no side effects other than what we wanted.

My previous coreboot build script was using the ME image from the local machine, but unfortunately, I can’t do that now for disabling the ME since it’s not supported on the ME image that most people have on their machines. So I updated my coreboot build script to make it download the new ME version from a public link (found here), and I used bsdiff to patch the ME image with the proper configuration for the WiFi to work. I made sure to check that the only changes to the ME image is in the MFS partition and is configuration data, so the binary patch does not contain any binary code and we can safely distribute it.

Moving towards the FSP

The next step will be to continue the reverse-engineering efforts, but for now, I’ve put that on hold because Positive Technologies have announced that they found an exploit in the ME Firmware allowing the executing of unsigned code. This exploit will be announced at the BlackHat Europe 2017 conference in December, so we’ll have to wait and see how their exploit works and what we can achieve with it before going further. Also, once Positive Technologies release their information, it might be possible for us to work together and share our knowledge. I am hoping that I can get some information from them on code that they already reverse engineered, so I don’t have to duplicate all of their efforts. I’d also like to mention that, just as last time, Igor Skochinsky has generously shared his research with us, but also getting data from Positive Technologies would be a tremendous help, considering how much work they have already invested on this.

Right now, I have decided to move my focus to investigating the FSP, which is another important binary that needs to be reverse-engineered and removed from coreboot. I don’t think that anyone is currently actively working on it, so hopefully, I can achieve something without duplicating someone else’s work, and we can advance the cause much faster this way. I think I will concentrate first on the PCH initialization code, then move to the memory initialization.

Purism Partners with Nextcloud to Build and Include End-to-End Encrypted Storage Products and Services

Purism Partners with Nextcloud to Build and Include End-to-End Encrypted Storage Products and Services

SAN FRANCISCO, Calif., October 18, 2017 – Purism, maker of security-focused computing devices, is partnering with Nextcloud for a series of products and services. Nextcloud, author of a popular open-source self hosted, privacy-focused file sync and share solution, is looking to expand and become a default on Purism’s mobile and desktop computing products.

Purism, fresh off of successfully meeting their crowdfunding goal of $1.5 million to build and deliver the Librem 5, adds another partner in Nextcloud, fresh off the announcement of new end-to-end encryption upgrades in Nextcloud 13. This partnership adds to Purism’s roster of open-source partners that will aim to make the Librem 5 the most comprehensive free open-source smartphone to ever hit the market.

“Having Nextcloud applications built into the Librem 5, as well as default within PureOS, will help people have a convenient, ethical encrypted file storage service alongside other easy-to-use defaults” says Todd Weaver, Founder and CEO of Purism.

“Partnering with Purism gets our software directly into the hands of customers, making their lives easier with security and privacy protection built-in” says Jos Poortvliet, Co-founder and Head of Marketing at Nextcloud.

Purism plans to include Nextcloud in the Librem 5 phone, as well as within PureOS for its Librem 13 and Librem 15 laptops. Additionally, Purism will be discussing with Nextcloud about a future Purism NAS that runs completely free software including Nextcloud and services.

“Nextcloud follows our strict beliefs in digital rights for people, and this partnership is a clear win for users by merging convenience and ethics together into simple products” adds Weaver.

About Nextcloud

Nextcloud offers the industry-leading fully open source solution for on-premise data handling and communication with an uncompromising focus on security and privacy and unprecedented scalability. Nextcloud brings together universal access to data with next-generation secure communication and collaboration capabilities under direct control of IT and integrated with existing compliant infrastructure. Nextcloud’s open, modular architecture, emphasis on security and advanced federation capabilities enable modern enterprises to leverage their existing assets within and across the borders of their organization.

About Purism

Purism is a Social Purpose Corporation devoted to bringing security, privacy, software freedom, and digital independence to everyone’s personal computing experience. With operations based in San Francisco (California) and around the world, Purism manufactures premium-quality laptops, tablets and phones, creating beautiful and powerful devices meant to protect users’ digital lives without requiring a compromise on ease of use. Purism designs and assembles its hardware in the United States, carefully selecting internationally sourced components to be privacy-respecting and fully Free-Software-compliant. Security and privacy-centric features come built-in with every product Purism makes, making security and privacy the simpler, logical choice for individuals and businesses.

Media Contact

Marie Williams, Coderella / Purism
+1 415-689-4029
See also the Purism press room for additional tools and announcements.

Purism Collaborates with Cryptocurrency Monero to Enable Mobile Payments

Purism plans to utilize Monero’s privacy respecting platform to build a cash-like, digital payment system for Librem 5 smartphone users

SAN FRANCISCO, Calif., October 13, 2017 — Purism, maker of security focused hardware and software, today announced a collaboration with Monero, the only secure decentralized currency that is private by default. Purism recently started accepting Monero for payments in its online store, and this is a continuation of the company’s support for the cryptocurrency.

As more central services like Equifax are hacked, exposing vulnerable user data in unprecedented ways that cause permanent damage to people’s privacy, it has become clear that centralized, individually identifiable, historic, and permanent digital footprints create a serious threat to digital privacy and human rights. Purism, on the heels of its successful smartphone crowdfunding campaign which has raised more than $1.5 million, is looking to address this threat by incorporating cryptocurrencies by default into its mobile phone design, beginning with Monero.

“We must proactively plan for and address digital rights issues in the here and now, because by the time we face them in the future the damage will be irreversible,” said Todd Weaver, Founder & CEO of Purism. “Collaboration with Monero allows us to offer users a much lower barrier to entry for leveraging the benefits of a cryptocurrency, and our aim is to make it incredibly simple to use your Librem 5 smartphone to make secure, cash-like payments that safeguard your private information.”

Monero’s cryptocurrency offers a fungible, decentralized, private currency that is created to be identical to centuries of physical world transaction processes, primarily that cash given for goods or services is a one-time, non-recorded, mutual transaction.

“Collaborating with Purism addresses a major pain point for Monero. The Librem 5 makes it easy for the average user to use Monero for real world transactions on a mobile platform. In addition, the Librem 5, by using Free Libre Open Source Software provides the user with the opportunity to verify to a very high level its end point security, privacy and decentralization. This is in sharp contrast to many mobile platforms where the user has to trust a proprietary implementation. I am very excited to see the Librem 5 planning to have Monero support by default,” Francisco Cabañas, Core Team Member, The Monero Project.

“Creating a future where a person can buy or sell digital goods or services and still respect their privacy, similarly to cash but on the Internet, is a long-time dream that we plan to make a reality,” says Weaver.

Integrating Monero into Purism’s Librem 5 smartphone as part of its default mobile payment system can solve the problems plaguing the online transaction space, removing banks from the transaction, removing all central storage of private user data, keeping transactions private between two parties, all backed by the strength of an immutable cryptographic blockchain ledger.

About Monero

The Monero Project is a grassroots, community-driven initiative that advocates for privacy on a global scale by producing several free libre open source software projects, with the flagship offering being Monero, a fungible and decentralized cryptocurrency. The important guiding philosophies of Monero are security (ensuring that users are able to trust Monero with their transactions, without risk of error or attack), privacy (ensuring that users can transact Monero without fear of coercion, censorship, or surveillance), and decentralization (ensuring that no single person or group can control the network or reverse transactions). The goal is to provide a level of fungibility and privacy that is analogous to that of cash for the digital world.

About Purism

Purism is a Social Purpose Corporation devoted to bringing security, privacy, software freedom, and digital independence to everyone’s personal computing experience. With operations based in San Francisco (California) and around the world, Purism manufactures premium-quality laptops, tablets and phones, creating beautiful and powerful devices meant to protect users’ digital lives without requiring a compromise on ease of use. Purism designs and assembles its hardware in the United States, carefully selecting internationally sourced components to be privacy-respecting and fully Free-Software-compliant. Security and privacy-centric features come built-in with every product Purism makes, making security and privacy the simpler, logical choice for individuals and businesses.

Media Contact

Marie Williams, Coderella / Purism
+1 415-689-4029
See also the Purism press room for additional tools and announcements.

Purism Meets Its $1.5 Million Goal for Security Focused Librem 5 Smartphone One Week After Surging Past the 50% Mark

Self-hosted crowdfunder out grosses combined funding of Purism’s previous three campaigns

SAN FRANCISCO, Calif., October 9, 2017 — Purism, the social purpose corporation which designs and produces popular privacy conscious hardware and software, has reached its $1.5 million crowdfunding goal to create the world’s first encrypted, open smartphone ecosystem that gives users complete device control, the Librem 5. After amassing incredible support from GNU/Linux enthusiasts and the Free/Open-Source community at large, forging partnerships with KDE and the GNOME Foundation in the process, Purism plans to use the remaining two weeks of the campaign to push for its stretch goals and start working on the next steps for bringing the phone to market.

Reaching the $1.5 million milestone weeks ahead of schedule enables Purism to accelerate the production of the physical product. The company plans to move into hardware production as soon as possible to assemble a developer kit as well as initiate building the base software platform, which will be publicly available and open to the developer community.

Breaking away from the iOS/Android OS duopoly, the Librem 5’s isolation-based security-focused PureOS will offer basic communication services: phone, email, messaging, voice, camera, browsing, and will expand after shipment and over time to update with more free software applications, through shared collaboration with the developer community (not “read-only open source”, but true free software collaboration). In addition to the ability to integrate with both GNOME and Plasma Mobile, the $599 Librem 5 will come equipped with hardware kill switches, a popular feature in Purism’s laptops, that allow for users to turn on and off the camera, microphone, WiFi and Bluetooth at will.

“We are thrilled that the community has supported us in making this goal a reality, and now comes the real work of bringing the Librem 5 to production and into the hands of our backers,” says Todd Weaver, Founder and CEO, Purism. “We believe we’ve demonstrated a growing interest in technologies that proactively protect and secure our digital identities, and are proud to be a part of catalyzing this movement.”

The impressive milestone has already generated celebration in the community:

About Purism

Purism is a Social Purpose Corporation devoted to bringing security, privacy, software freedom, and digital independence to everyone’s personal computing experience. With operations based in San Francisco (California) and around the world, Purism manufactures premium-quality laptops, tablets and phones, creating beautiful and powerful devices meant to protect users’ digital lives without requiring a compromise on ease of use. Purism designs and assembles its hardware in the United States, carefully selecting internationally sourced components to be privacy-respecting and fully Free-Software-compliant. Security and privacy-centric features come built-in with every product Purism makes, making security and privacy the simpler, logical choice for individuals and businesses.

Media Contact

Marie Williams, Coderella / Purism
+1 415-689-4029
See also the Purism press room for additional tools and announcements.

Initial Touch and Web Browsing experiments on Librem 5 prototyping boards

When it comes to prototyping the Librem 5, we are working hard and making progress on several sides. As you have seen in yesterday’s testing update blog post, we are working on development hardware in order to start getting software development groundwork done. Today, I’m sharing the results of a quick experiment with web and touch on a prototype board. Read more

Librem 5 Campaign Surges Past One Million Dollars

Purism Raises $1 Million to Deliver KDE, GNOME Foundation and Matrix Endorsed Security Phone to Crowdfunding Backers

Support for Encrypted, Privacy Smartphone Librem 5 Reaches Two-Thirds Mark With 2.5 Weeks To Go

SAN FRANCISCO, Calif., October 4, 2017 — As overwhelming support continues to pour in from the people wanting to have an ethical mobile phone that avoids Google Android and Apple iOS, Purism, the manufacturer that builds high-quality, top of the range and freedom-respecting devices, earlier today surpassed the $1 million milestone in their current crowdfunding campaign which will allow the company to build the Librem 5: the first truly privacy and security focused smartphone that has been endorsed by Matrix.org, KDE and the GNOME Foundation.

Purism, no stranger to successful crowdfunding campaigns, has built and established a strong reputation from programmers, security experts, and people wanting to protect their digital life by delivering on their promise to manufacture and distribute high-end privacy and security focused laptops that are the most secure high-end current computing devices on the market today. Crowdfunded campaigns for the Librem 15 and Librem 13 laptops in 2015 both doubled their funding goals and was delivered to backers. Reception and demand for both laptops fueled Purism to manufacture more units which were made accessible for General Availability earlier this summer.

One of the more popular features from the Librem 15 and Librem 13 that will be included in the $599 Librem 5 is the hardware kill switches that allow users to turn on and off the camera, microphone, WiFi and Bluetooth at will.

Providing a new alternative outside of the iOS/Android OS duopoly, the Librem 5’s isolation-based security-focused PureOS, upon shipment, in addition to the having the ability to integrate with both GNOME and Plasma Mobile, will offer basic communication services: phone, email, messaging, voice, camera, browsing, and will expand after shipment and over time to update with more free software applications, through shared collaboration with the developer community. Key to providing this in the Librem 5, Purism is partnering with open​ ​source​ ​communications​ ​project​ ​Matrix.org to enable end-to-end​ ​encrypted​, ​decentralized communication​ ​in​ the ​dialler​ ​and​ ​messaging​ ​app.

The crowdfunding campaign raised $100,000 in the first 100 hours and raised over $200,000 in each of the last three weeks, reaching $1 million in individual preorders, enterprise sales and community support with just under three weeks left to go.

News of the proposed phone has been met with enthusiasm and excitement for the hope of this new fully free/libre and open-source GNU/Linux phone hitting the market:

Librem 5, GNU/Linux-powered smartphone w/Privacy features – Lunduke Show

Why you should support the Librem 5 phone. (IT RUNS GNU/LINUX)

Purism’s Librem 5 Phone – Count Me In 🙂

Matrix Live – Purism Librem 5 Special!

“Crossing $1 million in funding this early with the help of uniting many ethical communities and security-conscious parties has been really exciting,” says Todd Weaver, Founder and CEO, Purism. “We are on our way to the $1.5m goal allowing us to deliver a phone that finally frees us from the shackles of the Android and iOS smartphone duopoly.”

About Purism

Purism is a Social Purpose Corporation devoted to bringing security, privacy, software freedom, and digital independence to everyone’s personal computing experience. With operations based in San Francisco (California) and around the world, Purism manufactures premium-quality laptops, tablets and phones, creating beautiful and powerful devices meant to protect users’ digital lives without requiring a compromise on ease of use. Purism designs and assembles its hardware in the United States, carefully selecting internationally sourced components to be privacy-respecting and fully Free-Software-compliant. Security and privacy-centric features come built-in with every product Purism makes, making security and privacy the simpler, logical choice for individuals and businesses.

Media Contact

Marie Williams, Coderella / Purism
+1 415-689-4029
See also the Purism press room for additional tools and announcements.